Database authentication via cryptographic checksums represents an important approach to achieving an affordable safeguard of the integriry of data in publicly accessible database systems against illegal manipulations. This paper revisits the issue of database integrity and offers a new method of safeguarding the authenticity of data in database systems. The method is based on the recent development of pseudo-random function families and sibling intractable function families, rather than on the traditional use of cryptosystems. The database authentication scheme can be applied to records or fields.
Introduction
T he problem of providing integrity to data stored in database systems has been a subject of interest among researchers for a number of years. In many cases the need to maintain the integrity of the data carried a higher priority than the need for information secrecy. Examples of such situations range from public medical information 0167-4048/94/$7 .00 © 1994, Elsevier Science Ltd to statistical results from public events (e.g. elections) which are publicly readable, but which can be modified only by authorized users.
The most common method of ensuring integrity of data in a database is to use cryptographic checksums. A checksum is typically calculated on a piece of data (such as a database field entry or a record) as a function of some secret parameter which is available only to the authorized users.
The notion of a cryptographic checksum has been embodied in the past within the concept of a database filter which is to be located between the user and the database management system. From the point of view of the development of database security technology, the concept of a filter was perhaps one of the earliest to appear due to its simplicity. Given a database system to be protected, it was only natural to think initially of an intermediary between the user and the database system, in the form of a filter that simply screens out data according to some policy for labelling data.
One of the earliest realizations of the idea of a filter was the integrity lock approach, which was suggested initially by the us Air Force Summer Study on Multilevel Data Management Security in 1982 [1] . The notion of a 'spray paint' to label elements in the database system was also suggested by the study. The integrity lock approach applied a checksum function to the contents of each record, and maintained this checksum for each record to detect illegal tampering by opponents who by-passed the filter.
Ideally, the checksum should be a cryptographic hash function or encryption algorithm which is resistant to attacks based on cryptanalysis. The checksum is calculated whenever data is to be stored in the database system, and it is recomputed and compared with the stored checksum to detect illegal changes since the last modification of the data. The data in the records are not encrypted, to allow record processing by the database system, and the correct labelling of data remains the task of the filter. These checksums provide only error detection, not error correction.
The use of checksums for data in database records has received attention, notably in the works of Denning (2-4] and Graubart et al. (S-7] . The work by Denning in [2] is significant because it identifies the granularity of the data to be protected, namely whole records, whole attributes or individual data elements.
The other major work on the integrity lock approach was by Graubart [SJ, where it was applied to a commercial 'off-the-shelf' database management system. The components of the integrity lock design in [5] are the Un trusted Front End (UTFE), the Trusted Front End (TFE) and the untrusted database management system. The UTFE performs query parsing and the formatting of output to the user. The TFE performs tasks such as user authentication, tuple formatting, projections of data, and the calculations and verification of the checksums. The untrusted database system performs the usual tasks of record searching, tuple selection, insertion and deletion, and also database reconfiguration. The tuple in the database is left as plaintext for performance reasons, while the label and checksum are encrypted. As expected, the use of encryption expands the storage requirements of the database.
574
The implementation of the integrity lock design was done on the MISTRESS database management system running on the Unix operating system [7] .
A description of the operating system support environment for the integrity lock approach is given by Graubart and Kramer [6] .
In this paper we follow the direction taken by Denning [2] and Graubart [S] in the use of cryptographic techniques to achieve record authentication. However, unlike these approaches which use symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems to generate a checksum, our approach is based on the application of the concept of the sibling intractable function family (SIFF) which was first introduced by the work in [8] .
In the previous approaches based on the use of cryptosystems a choice had to be made between a checksum for the entire record and a checksum for each data element in the record. The first method was advantageous in terms of space requirements, but resulted in the need to involve every data element in the record when the intention was to authenticate only one data element. The second method remedied this difficulty by creating a separate checksum for each data element in the record. In this way each data element could be authenticated independently of the other data elements, but the space requirements would be more than those for the first method. However, with today's rapidly decreasing cost of secondary storage the second method is becoming less intolerable.
Our approach in the checksum calculation for plaintext (or enciphered) records is based on having a single checksum for each record. However, our approach allows each data element in the record to be authenticated independently of the others using the same record checksum. Another advantage lies in the flexibility of placing the description of the instances of SIFF associated with each record in the same storage as the records. This removes the need to have specialized secure storage which, in general, is several magnitudes higher in cost than the ordinary secondary storage media. Finally, our approach allows the authentication of data elements without necessarily needing any secret cryptographic information. This compares favourably to Denning's approach whereby a secret encryption key must be used before any data element can be authenticated.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 the necessary definitions of the sibling intractable function family and of the pseudorandom function family will be presented. This is followed by the use of the sibling intractable function family for record authentication in Section 3, and its further use for the generation of cryptographic keys in the case of the encipherment of the database in Section 4. The paper is closed by some remarks and conclusion in Section 5.
Background in cryptography
This section introduces two basic constructs for our database authentication scheme, namely,
pseudo-random function families and sibling intractable Junction families (SIFF).
Denote by .IV the set of all positive integers, n a security parameter, L the alphabet {O, I} and # 5 the number of elements in a set S. By x E R 5 we mean that x is chosen randomly and uniformly from the set s. The composition of two functions J and g is defined as J og (x) =f(g(x) ). Throughout the paper I and m will be used to denote polynomials from .IV to .IV.
Let F= {Fnl n E.IV} be an infinite family of functions, where Fn= (f1j:LI(n)-> Lm(n)}. We call F a function family mapping I (n)-bit input to m(n)-bit output string. F is polynomial time computable if there is a polynomial time algorithm (in n) computing all J E F, and samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, on input n E.IV, outputs uniformly at random a description ofJEF n · Now, we introduce the definition of pseudorandom functions [9] which will be applied in Section 3. Intuitively, F = {F n I n E.IV} is a pseudorandom function family if, to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, the output of a function J chosen randomly and uniformly from F n , whose description is unknown to the algorithm, appears to be totally uncorrelated to the input of J, even if the algorithm can choose input for f The formal definition is described in terms of (uniform) we assume that the security labels will be applied at the record level, incorporated into the record identifier R j • Hence, R j should be unique for each record and is assumed to contain enough information to determine the security classification of the record. If security classification is to be applied at the data element level, then it is assumed that for each field F an additional field F j exists in the record which contains the security classification of data element Xij (see [2, 3] ). We also assume that a key Kdb for the whole database exists, and is stored in a tamper-free condition. In the remainder of this paper we will use the term trusted party (TP) to denote a trusted agent which holds the secret cryptographic information necessary for the checksum generation and verification, and for the encipherment and decipherment of data in the records. The trusted party can be an intermediary between the user and the database, or it can be a separate function in the database system. However, we will not be concerned any further with the acrual architecture of the system that incorporates the trusted party.
The use of SIFF to calculate checksums for fields provides an alternative method for data integrity. The calculation of record checksums using SIFF has the major advantage of field checksums, namely that it allows a single checksum value to be associated with each record yet allows each data item to be authenticated independently of other data items in the record .
Mathematical description
Consider an (a + 1 )-SIFF, where a is an integer denoting the number of fields in each record i including the record identifier Ri and its security classification. We assume that every record follows this arrangement uniformly. XilIlRi"Fi X i2 11R i llF2
where Si is a randomly chosen n-bit string, the checksum for record i. Here' II' denotes concatenation. In this way the data element X ij (1 s;, j s;, a) can be authenticated when is satisfied. This process is shown in Fig. 1 .
Checking instances of SIFF
Ideally, the description of the instances of SIFF hi should be placed in secure storage within the security perimeter of the trusted party. However, due to the large size of the description of these instances of SIFF a more manageable approach would be to store them in a 'shadow' database or together with the actual data in the database. In any case, the description of the instances h, of SIFF can be placed in a publicly readable storage since any modifications to them or to the checksums Si can be detected through the use of Sdb. That is, if hi of record i is modified illegally into h;, then using the false h; will not yield the correct checksum value, as shown in the following: Fig. 1 . Using SIFF for database authentication.
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due to the fact that Sdb is secret. This is true even if the false h; yields the correct checksum for all the fields Fp F z ' ... , Fa:
If Si is modified illegally into 5; then the output of hi will not match the false 5;. This is shown in the following:
Suppose that both hi and Si are illegally modified into h; and 5; respectively; theri, due to the participation of the secret Sdb' we still have that which indicates that the illegal modifications have occurred.
The sibling intractable property of SIFF allows the detection by the trusted party of any illegal modification to either or both of hi and Si. The secrecy of
Sdb is necessary to ensure that only the trusted party can create Si through the selection of a suitable instance ofSIFF hi for record i.
Field authentication
The idea of maintaining a checksum for whole fields (or attributes) was also suggested by Denning [2, 3] . Similar to record checksums, an instance h ) of a (/3 + 1 )-SIFF can be used for field checksums as follows:
hj (f,db(F;
where /3 is the number of records in the database.
This approach, however, is impractical because the update of a value Xi; (1 ~ i ~ /3, 1 ~ j~ a) requires the involvement of all" the field values Xlj' XZj' ... ,
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Xf3j in the recalculation of the checksum Sj. This approach is more suitable to be applied to fields which are rarely changed, such as an employee'S name and birth date in the case of a company database.
Security of the database authentication scheme
The record authentication scheme in eq.
(1) can be considered secure if it is computationally difficult for an illegal user (or a trojan horse) to find the secret value Sdb even when the user knows K db , hi and Si. We will assume that the computational power of an illegal user or a trojan horse is bounded by probabilistic polynomial time.
In more definite terms, we can say that for a database with a total of /3 records, each having a different instance Iz i of SIFF associated with it, the record authentication scheme is secure if, for any data element X,j in the database, for any polynomial Q, and for all sufficiently large n, the probability that an illegal user or a trojan horse can find Sdb using
Kdb is less than I1Q(n). This also holds true when every record i in the database is given a different key K db , (i = 1, ... , /3) which are all known to the illegal user or the trojan horse. Now, the ability of an illegal user or a trojan horse to calculate Sdb is equivalent to that of predicting outputs of a pseudo-random function. This is a contradiction to the definition of pseudo-random function families. In fact, the ability of an illegal user or a trojan horse to obtain even the input string .L(Rillsdb) (or J,Jl) llsdb)) represents a further contradiction. Such an ability implies that the user or the trojan horse is able to invert or to find a collision string for the sibling intractable function family, both cases of which have a negligible probability of happening. Hence, the database authentication scheme in eqs. (1) and (2) is secure provided that Sdb remains secret.
Using SIFF to generate encipherment keys
Independent, but related to the issue of database authentication, is the issue of protection of the database from illegal access. One possible method of preventing illegal access to records in the database is by way of encipherment techniques. In simple terms, this involves the encipherment of records in the database using a cryptosystem that requires an encipherment key as one of its parameters. The database then consists of enciphered records which can be read or updated only through the use of the decipherment key (which may be different, but related, to the encipherment key).
In the trusted party concept it is intended that a user should interact with the database through the trusted party, which on behalf of the user accesses the database, deciphers the retrieved records and presents the resulting plaintext records to the user. Records with fields of higher security classification than the user's security clearance can be filtered out, or the whole record can be suppressed from the user. Hence it is the task of a user to present some form of identification information to the trusted party, which then authenticates the user and retrieves the required data from the database depending on the user's security clearance.
The simplest use of a SIFF in this simation is for it to derive the decipherment key by using the user's secret key or password as input to the instance of SIFF. Assume that there are P users having the secret keys Ku I' ... , Kup respectively. Furthermore, assume that KT is the secret key of the trusted party, haec is the instance of SIFF maintained as a secret by the trusted party, and Kdec is the decipherment key. The trusted party must choose uniformly and randomly from Hn an instance haec of a P-SIFF such thac
Note that here Kdec should never be visible or accessible to the users. Hence its derivation must be a guarded privilege of the trusted party. The enciphered records are then retrieved by the trusted party and deciphered using Kdec within the security bounds of the trusted party.
This simple idea using SIFF, as expressed in eq. (3), can be extended further to the multilevel case where users are grouped according to their security clearances, each group having access to a subset of the database depending on the security clearance. ,
Conclusion
An alternative approach to the authentication of databases has been the topic of research in this paper. The approach is realized in a scheme which is based on pseudo-random functions and the sibling intractable function family (SIFF). The security of the scheme has been shown to be equivalent to predicting the output of pseudorandom functions and inverting the sibling intractable function family, both of which have a small probability of occurring.
The scheme, which has been discussed in the context of the concept of the trusted party that acts as an intermediary between the user and the database, allows each record to be associated with one checksum which can be used to verify the authenticity of one data element within the record independently from other data elements. The scheme also has the advantage that it requires only a small amount of information to be maintained secret, which is something affordable for the trusted party. Related to this is the advantage that the description of the instances of SIFF can be placed in the same storage area as the records of the database and their associated checksums. In this way no secure storage needs to be assigned for the maintenance of the instances of SIFF arid the checksums. The scheme is also suitable for the generation of encipherment (and decipherment) keys in enciphered databases to allow only legal access to the database.
